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"To be intimate with the land .. . is to enclose it in the
same moral universe we occupy, to include it in the mean-
ing of the word community.,
2
"There is yet no ethic dealing with man's relation to land
and to the animals and plants which grow upon it. Land..
. is still property. The land-relation is still strictly eco-
nomic, entailing privileges but not obligations.
3
I. INTRODUCTION
The law, by its very nature, moves slowly. It is a deliberate and stubborn
process, reluctant to bow to the whims of political fancy or popular opinion.
At its heart is the concept of stare decisis which means literally "to stand by
things decided.",4 This concept dictates that a court look to the past to de-
termine the law for the present and, while it provides a measure of predict-
ability to the law, it is by definition a backward-looking concept.
Science, on the other hand, is a forward-looking concept. Often with an
eye on improving human lives, science has pushed the bounds of under-
standing through the rapid development of technology. As science has de-
veloped, it has illuminated our understanding of the natural world. The
appreciation of ecosystems is continually expanding in such a way as to
make the world seem larger every day.
1. J.D. Univiersity of Montana School of Law, 2006.
2. Barry Lopez, The Rediscovery of North America 34 (1st ed., Vintage Books 1992).
3. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac 238 (Ballantine Books 1949).
4. Black's Law Dictionary 661 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2d pocket ed., West 2001).
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Environmentalism is stuck somewhere in between. It started by attempt-
ing to preserve vestiges of primeval America - the idea that there once was
a time in which North America existed in a vacuum, free of human influ-
ence, and that environmentalists should struggle to preserve these parcels of
land that reflected this "natural" state of the New World.5 And while in
time an environmental "movement" did develop, only in the last twenty to
thirty years have environmental organizations consistently sought redress in
the courts to protect the interests they seek to preserve.
Significantly, the law is ill-suited to afford environmental litigants the
protection they seek. An institution such as the law, which bases its very
existence in the past, has few mechanisms for addressing the concerns of
environmentalism, which has only arrived on the scene in the last century.
Even the flurry of environmental legislation passed in the 1960's and
1970's leaves a fundamental gap in the law's ability to provide a coherent
and nuanced appreciation of the values of natural processes. Laws such the
Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the
Wilderness Act take a piecemeal approach, each seeking to protect an inde-
pendent and distinct part of Earth's natural systems, but none take a holistic
approach to ecosystem management. Other legislation of the time, such as
the National Environmental Policy Act, Federal Land Policy Management
Act, and the National Forest Management Act are more process driven and,
rather than seeking to protect particular components of ecosystems, directs
the management functions of administrative agencies.
Although such legislation was a historic shift in the human approach to-
wards the natural world, there are significant gaps in this approach. These
gaps become more glaring as science continues to develop at such a rapid
rate and our understanding of ecosystems and natural processes continues to
flourish. All too frequently, these laws, revolutionary when passed, are
now left with their feet nailed to the proverbial floor, unable to provide the
protection that science increasingly tells us is needed. As University of
Colorado law professor, Charles Wilkinson put it, "[w]e need to acknowl-
edge the tendency of the law, as an institution, to shut out the small and the
innovative." 
6
One area in which the law's limitations for environmental litigants is par-
ticularly apparent is in the concept of standing. While courts have made
inroads in acknowledging the interests that a love of nature fosters and en-
vironmentalism seeks to protect, a well-rounded and thoughtful approach to
standing for environmental litigants is still lacking. This limitation is ex-
emplified by the decision in Ursus Americanus v. Wildlife Services.7
5. For an overview of the evolution of environmental thought in American history see Roderick
Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind (4th ed., Yale University 2001).
6. Charles Wilkinson, The Eagle Bird: Mapping a New West, 13 (rev. ed., Johnson Books 1999).
7. 2004 WL 2127182 (D. Or. Sept. 23, 2004).
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II. FACTS OF URSUSAMERICANUS V. WILDLIFE SERVICES
The United States Department of Agriculture's Wildlife Services (Wild-
life Services) program provides assistance to local landowners dealing with
wildlife problems on their property. 8 Such assistance typically consists of
removing or killing wildlife depredating on livestock or destroying crops.
The Wildlife Services receives funding from the fees charged to landowners
utilizing the program's services. However, for Oregon residents, Wildlife
Services is not the only means of dealing with troublesome wildlife. Spe-
cifically, by statute, an Oregon landowner may kill any "cougar, bobcat, red
fox or bear" without need of a permit. 9 Thus, Oregon landowners have two
options available: contract with Wildlife Services to remove the wildlife or
take matters into their own hands.
In Ursus, a coalition of environmental and animal rights groups chal-
lenged Wildlife Services' compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) in its decision to kill black bears causing damage to
timber on local landowners' property in western Oregon. ° Specifically,
plaintiffs alleged that Wildlife Services violated NEPA by failing to com-
plete an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)."t Alternatively, plaintiffs
claimed that Wildlife Services "prepared an inadequate Environmental As-
sessment (EA) upon which it based its Finding of No Significant Impact
(FONSI)." 12
In January 2003, Wildlife Services published a Notice of Availability for
an EA which determined that its bear control program would not have any
significant environmental impacts that were not already disclosed in the
earlier EIS.13 Three months later, Wildlife Services published a Notice of
Availability for the FONSI. 14 Plaintiffs responded in May by filing suit and
seeking a temporary restraining order in United States District Court. 15 At
the conclusion of oral arguments on the temporary restraining order, the
court determined plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed the case without
prejudice. Plaintiffs filed a subsequent lawsuit six months later. 16
8. United States Department of Agriculture, Wildlife Services - Oregon,
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ws/pdf/oregon.pdf (accessed Mar. 23, 2005).
9. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 498.012(2)(a) (West 2003).
10. Ursus Americanus, 2004 WL 2127182 at 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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III. HOLDING
The court never ruled on the issue of whether Wildlife Services failed to
comply with NEPA. Rather, the court held the plaintiffs lacked standing
and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. ' 7
Specifically, the court agreed with defendant's arguments that plaintiffs
lacked standing because they were unable to show injury in fact or redress-
ability. 18 In this finding, the court relied on testimony from individuals
who claimed they would be affected by Wildlife Services' bear control pro-
gram. In earlier oral arguments for the temporary restraining order, plain-
tiffs introduced one individual who claimed she would suffer "psychologi-
cal injury" by knowing that bears which had traversed her property might
be killed and that she would suffer a diminished opportunity to view bears
in the area, if they were killed.' 9 Later, at oral argument on summary judg-
ment, plaintiffs relied on a hunter who claimed he would have diminished
chances of successfully hunting black bears and a photographer who
claimed a diminished chance of successfully photographing bears, if the
Wildlife Services killed them.2°
The court found that these injuries were "tenuous" and, in a footnote,
noted the individuals' injuries were logically at odds with one another be-
cause the photographer's interest would be theoretically lessened whether it
was Wildlife Services or the hunter killing the bears. 21 Additionally, the
court relied on the fact that it was uncontested that the overall black bear
population in western Oregon remained healthy, regardless of any regional
variations. 22
As to redressability, the court stated that regardless of whether Wildlife
Services engaged in further NEPA analysis, there was no proof that this
would stop the killing of bears because Oregon law allows landowners to
kill troublesome bears without first obtaining a permit. 23 Thus, if Wildlife
Services did not kill the bears, local landowners would. In response, plain-
tiffs argued that even if landowners continued to kill bears, there was no
evidence that they would do so in as great of numbers as if Wildlife Ser-
vices did the killing. 24 The court, however, disregarded the argument say-
ing there was no factual support for it in the record.25
17. Id. at 1.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. ld. at n. 2.
22. Id. at 4.





IV. BACKGROUND OF STANDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGANTS
The concept of standing finds its genesis in the "cases" and "controver-
sies" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitution. Specifi-
cally, the Constitution limits the American judiciary's authority to "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party., 26 Over time, courts have found that a prospective plaintiff must
show three essential elements: "(1) injury in fact that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged action; and (3)
the likelihood, rather than mere speculation, that the injury will be re-
dressed by the court's favorable decision.
' 27
In addition, a plaintiff bringing a claim under NEPA must show that the
injury is within the "zone of interests" that NEPA is intended to protect.28
Essentially, the zone of interests test asks whether the suit is so marginally
related or inconsistent with the purposes of the underlying statute that one
could not presume Congress, in passing the act in question, intended to al-
low such a suit.29 The test is "not a demanding one ... [as the] asserted
interest need only be arguably within the zone of interests;" as such, a
"rough correspondence of interests is sufficient. 30
Generally, standing analysis for environmental litigants focuses on the
injury in fact requirement. Such claims brought under NEPA are typically
considered procedural injuries. 31 Notably, it is not the harm to the envi-
ronment the plaintiff must establish, but rather harm to the plaintiff from the
perceived environmental harm. 32 Environmental plaintiffs sufficiently al-
lege injury when they establish that they use the affected area and are per-
sons "for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be
lessened" if the action at issue is allowed. 33 In Friends of the Earth v. Laid-
law Environmental Services, the Supreme Court granted standing because
plaintiffs' members made specific allegations of harm as a result of the en-
vironmental damage - specifically a reluctance to use a polluted river. The
mere fact that the plaintiffs did not use the river because it was polluted was
insufficient to prevent a finding of standing.34 Additionally in Laidlaw, a
plaintiff who lived 20 miles away was still held to have standing.35 Thus, a
potential plaintiff need not live near to the challenged activity. Rather, it is
26. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
27. Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2001).
28. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1499 (9th Cir. 1995).
29. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Assn., 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).
30. Presidio Golf Club v. Natl. Park Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 1998).
31. Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1122 (D. Or. 2002).
32. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000).
33. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972).
34. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184.
35. Id. at 182.
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sufficient to show "repeated recreational use . . . accompanied by a credible
allegation of desired future use ... even if relatively infrequent."
3 6
Even mere desire to watch an animal for aesthetic purposes is "undenia-
bly a cognizable interest for purposes of standing."37 Notably, in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court struck down an environmental
group's challenge to federal funding of overseas programs which might
have an impact on endangered species in other countries. 38 The Court, led
by Justice Antonin Scalia, determined that because Defenders of Wildlife's
members had not suffered injury to a cognizable interest, they failed to
meet the injury in fact portion of standing. 39 Specifically, the Court found
the affidavits of the group's members lacking insofar as none of the indi-
viduals were actually in the countries in question or had specific itineraries
for trips in the near future. 40 Although the Court later acknowledged that
the redressability portion of standing was most obviously lacking, 41 it is
probably Justice Scalia's treatment of the injury in fact question that is most
likely to be remembered. Indeed, as Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent,
"[b]y requiring a 'description of concrete plans' or 'specifications of when
the some day [for a return visit] will be' the Court, in my view, demands
what is likely an empty formality. No substantial barriers prevent [plain-
tiffs] from simply purchasing plane tickets to return to the Aswan and Ma-
haweli projects."42
Once a plaintiff claiming a procedural injury "establishes injury in fact
under NEPA, the causation and redressability requirements are relaxed.
' 43
Significantly, in order to establish redressability the plaintiff asserting pro-
cedural standing is not required to show that properly following the proce-
dures will yield the result they seek.44 In a footnote, the court in Lujan ac-
knowledged that a plaintiff living near the construction site of a federal dam
would have procedural standing to challenge the agency's failure to comply
with NEPA, even if he could not establish that NEPA compliance would
have prevented the construction of the dam. S
Although causation and redressability are less frequently at issue in cases
dealing with standing for environmental litigants, they too can serve as a
basis for a determination that a plaintiff lacks standing. For example, plain-
tiffs challenging the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's decision to partially
fund a state agency's moose hunting program failed the redressability re-
36. Ecological Rights Found. v. P. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).
37. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992).
38. Id. at 578.
39. Id. at 564.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 568.
42. Id. at 592 (Blackmun, O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
43. Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 682.
44. Id.
45. 504 U.S. at 573, n. 7.
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quirement because it was acknowledged the program would continue even
without the federal funding.46 Additionally, in Lujan, the Court found that
plaintiffs challenge to federal agency actions lacked standing because the
agencies were not parties to the suit and, thus, any favorable judgment
would not be enforceable against them.47 Thus, because the agencies could
not be prevented from continuing to fund the challenged programs, the
plaintiffs failed to adequately establish redressability.
Despite the considerable amount of case law over the last three decades
addressing standing for environmental plaintiffs, perhaps the most critical
consideration of the concept comes from the Supreme Court's 1970 opinion
in Sierra Club v. Morton.48 In a subtle twist of judicial logic, reminiscent
of Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,49 the Court managed to
both dismiss the Sierra Club's complaint for lack of standing and, at the
same time, establish a new rule for environmental litigants that recognized
injuries to aesthetic and environmental values as sufficient to confer stand-
ing.5° While dismissing the Sierra Club's complaint for lack of standing
because it failed to aver that its members used the area in question and
would be affected by the proposed ski resort, the majority noted in a foot-
note that, "our decision does not, of course, bar the Sierra Club from seek-
ing in the District Court to amend its complaint by a motion under Rule 15,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 51
However, it was Justice William 0. Douglas, in his dissenting opinion,
who not only went one step further than the majority in his willingness to
confer standing, but gave an eloquent voice to the very interests environ-
mentalists seek to protect, for which the case is most remembered. Justice
Douglas argued that mountains, forests, rivers and other natural features,
because they are essential to Americans' way of life, should have standing
to sue on their own behalf. 52 Specifically, Justice Douglas believed courts
could simply name an individual who had a vested and emotional interest in
the place, as something akin to a guardian ad litem, to act on behalf of the
place. 53 Such individuals would have to be those who knew the place -
those who had camped or hiked there or who had run the river - and would
not include those who merely "flock" to defend the place because of wide-
spread media attention.54 While considered extreme at the time, the vision
Justice Douglas had, in many ways, has come to fruition. Today, environ-
mental litigants, in order to establish injury in fact, frequently are required
46. Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 570, 575 (D. Vt. 1997).
47. 504 U.S. at 568.
48. 405 U.S. 727.
49. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
50. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 738-40.
51. Id. at 735.
52. Id. at 749-50.
53. Id. at 750, n. 8.
54. Id. at 751-53.
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to bring individuals before the court, via testimony or affidavit, stating their
interest in the place and explaining how the activity in question limits their
enjoyment.
Ultimately, the court in Ursus, while purporting to follow this line of
case law and standing jurisprudence, simply disregards many of the above
holdings. While in the end the court probably reaches the right result, it did
so for the wrong reasons. Along the way, it shows a flippant disregard for
existing caselaw; sadly it is this disregard which may be the legacy of the
opinion.
V. ANALYSIS
While the court in Ursus found plaintiffs' claim lacked most in redress-
ability, the essential weakness of the holding rests in its failure to ade-
quately address the individual plaintiffs' claimed injuries (specifically, the
woman wishing to watch bears, the hunter and the photographer). How-
ever, this failure is not solely the fault of the court. Rather, it is a failure
that goes to the heart of the American legal system and its inability to ac-
count for the interests environmentalists seek to protect.
The court chose to adhere to a rigid and formal approach to the concept
of standing. The problem with this approach, however, is its unequal appli-
cation to potential plaintiffs. A corporation wishing to bring a claim, for
example, against the United States Forest Service for denial of a permit to
cut timber or mine a hillside, if denied, has essentially established injury in
fact. Such a plaintiff might still be prevented standing to bring such a claim
by one or both of the other requirements, but the injury in fact is nearly
presumed: the corporation has been prevented from doing something eco-
nomic in nature and, as a result, has been injured. Denial of an economic
opportunity is virtually per se injury in fact.
On the other hand, what economic interest does someone have in watch-
ing a ruby-crowned kinglet? Where is the money to be made from sitting
under a cottonwood tree, its furrowed bark at your back and the autumn sun
on your face? How much is your first glimpse of a wild bear worth?
The courts are unwilling to recognize economic value in certain envi-
ronmental interests. On one hand, this is a good thing. When environ-
mental interests undergo economic analysis they invariably lose out to jobs,
opportunity and continuing development. On the other hand, it poses an
additional question: what value do they have and how should it be ac-
counted for in the courtroom? Courts' answers have been simply to recog-
nize certain types of environmental interests as meeting the injury in fact
requirement for standing. Indeed, over the past couple of decades, courts
have increasingly liberalized this standard. The Supreme Court has even
gone so far as to say, "[t]he desire to use or observe an animal species, even
[Vol. 28
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for purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest for pur-
poses of standing. 
55
However, this standard, while a step in the right direction, fails in two re-
spects. First, by failing to presume an injury in fact in the same way that an
economic injury is virtually presumed, it places the additional burden on
environmental litigants to spend considerable time and effort finding indi-
viduals who can claim a significant interest in the place at issue, just to ap-
pease the court. This showing requires that someone prove in words that
they love a place. By its very nature such a showing is vastly more difficult
to prove than showing, for example, the loss of an economic opportunity.
Regardless of how liberally this standard is applied, there still will be situa-
tions in which individual plaintiffs are denied standing simply because a
judge finds they lack enough of a vested interest in a place and therefore,
have not been "injured."
Second, this standard allows for a vastly different application depending
on the jurisdiction. For example, in Ursus the court practically scoffed at
the notion that during earlier oral arguments one of the individual plaintiffs
claimed to have suffered a "psychological injury" from knowing that bears
which had been on her property might be killed by Wildlife Services. Ad-
ditionally, the court found it doubtful that the woman suffered any injury
from having a diminished opportunity to view bears after Wildlife Services
killed them.56 Although the Ursus court was not dealing with this specific
woman (she had testified at earlier oral arguments, but not at the particular
trial which was the basis of the opinion), the court found her claimed injury
to be so spectacularly deficient that it decided to discuss her claim even
though it was no longer before the court. It is difficult to see, how an indi-
vidual claiming an interest in being able to watch bears on her property fails
to meet the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Lujan ("[T]he desire
to use or observe an animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is
undeniably a cognizable interest for purposes of standing").57 Indeed, this
determination so egregiously ignores the Lujan standard that it raises the
question of whether the court regressed to a formalistic approach for show-
ing injury in fact that is so rigid and strict as to approach the code pleading
standards that existed prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Perhaps the court was waiting to hear the "magic words" and
determined that a claim of "psychological injury" was not magic enough to
suffice for standing. The practical difference, between acknowledging a
legal interest in watching wildlife and recognizing a "psychological injury"
from being prevented from watching wildlife is simply an exercise in se-
55. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-63.
56. UrsusAmericanus, 2004 WL 2127182 at4, n.8.
57. 504 U.S. at 562-63.
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mantics - unfortunately an exercise the Ursus court was willing to under-
take.
The court then scrutinized the plaintiffs', a hunter and a photographer,
stating their injuries were "tenuous" and logically inconsistent. 58  Again,
applying by the Lujan standard, it is difficult to see how a hunter and pho-
tographer could not meet the injury in fact standard. If wishing to merely
watch animals is a cognizable interest for standing, how is wishing to hunt
or photograph them not? Additionally, the court's decision to point out the
apparent "conflict" between an interest in hunting and photographing bears
is entirely beside the point. Each interest in the animals is reliant simply on
the black bear's existence. It does not matter that the interests are not the
same.
The court also noted the plaintiffs were unable to point to specific areas
in which bear populations would be impacted. This, too, is a weak applica-
tion of the injury in fact standard, primarily because it was uncontested that
bears would be killed. The mere fact that plaintiffs were unable to predict
specifically which bears and where they would be killed not only fails to
address plaintiffs' alleged injuries resulting from bear killings, but also
shows a basic ignorance for the very nature of wildlife population dynam-
ics. Additionally, it suggests a dichotomy between injury in fact for fixed
geographic landmarks versus wildlife, which are inherently mobile. Most
significantly, the court simply ignored the obvious: it is axiomatic that if
bears in a particular area are being exterminated by government agents,
then there will be fewer bears.
Excluding case law relied upon for summary judgment; the Ursus court
cited nine cases for substantive standing requirements for environmental
litigants. 59 Notably, in all of those cases except one, the plaintiffs were
found to have established injury in fact. 60  Specifically, an incredibly di-
verse group of plaintiffs were found to have established injury in fact:
birdwatchers; 61 individuals who were prevented from using rivers because
of pollution; 62 a county challenging NEPA compliance in the designation of
critical habitat for spotted owls; 6 3 a country club challenging NEPA com-
pliance for destruction of a building; 64 an Indian tribe challenging the Clin-
58. UrsusAmericanus, 2004 WL2127182 at4.
59. Specifically, in order they are: Cantrell, 241 F.3d 674; Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167; Douglas
County, 48 F.3d 1495; Presidio GolfClub, 155 F.3d 1153; Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555; Eco-
logical Rights Foundation, 230 F.3d 1141; Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.
2002); Fundfor Animals, 2 F. Supp. 2d 570; and Sierra Club v. Fish and Wildlife Services, 235 F. Supp.
2d 1109.
60. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562, 568 (finding that plaintiffs had established neither injury in fact nor
redressability).
61. Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 680.
62. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184; Ecological Rights Foundation, 230 F.3d at 1150-51.
63. Douglas County, 48 F.3dat 1501.
64. Presidio GolfClub, 155 F.3dat 1159-60.
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ton administration's "Roadless Rule" for national forests; 65 and an environ-
mental group's challenge of federal funding of a state predator control
study.66 If a country club is able to fall within the "zone of interest" for
injury in fact for a NEPA claim, it is unclear how a wildlife photographer
and a hunter fail to.
Indeed, this is perhaps the weakest link in the Ursus decision. Although
the court does not go so far as to say that the hunter and photographer de-
finitively had not suffered injury - probably because it knew it would de-
cide the case on redressability instead - its condescending discussion of
their claimed injuries is borderline antagonistic and simply disregards the
case law upon which the decision is based.
VI. A DIFFERENT APPROACH
While it should be noted that the Ursus court probably decided the case
correctly on redressability, it is the court's faulty application of injury in
fact for which it will most likely be remembered. It is for this reason, that a
new standard of injury in fact for environmental litigants could be applied
without flooding the court system with new cases or creating a new cause
of action.
The standard for injury in fact as it now exists not only lets cases such as
Ursus slip through the cracks, but it also focuses almost exclusively on
"charismatic mega-fauna:" the large and exciting animals such as wolves
and grizzly bears which, while significant, comprise a small part of an in-
tact ecosystem. As science continues to further our understanding of the
ecological underpinnings of wild places, environmental litigation which is
limited to such popular symbols might save good mountain views while
letting biological diversity fall by the wayside. For example, how might
one establish injury in fact for degradation of micro-organisms in the soil?
By the standard applied in Ursus, no one could legitimately claim a suffi-
cient interest in such seemingly insignificant creatures as to establish stand-
ing. Increasingly, science tells us that such organisms are essential building
blocks for viable, functioning ecosystems, which is to say, if there is no
healthy dirt, there are no grizzly bears.67
Courts have made efforts at relaxing standing requirements to allow en-
vironmental litigants access to the courtroom. For example, once plaintiffs
bringing a claim under NEPA have established injury in fact, the causation
65. Kootenai Tribe, 313 F.3d at 1112-13.
66. Sierra Club v. FWS, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 1124, 1126-27.
67. Despite their reputation as predators, grizzlies' diets consist largely of vegetation, including
grasses, sedges, horsetail, biscuit root, fireweed, roots, truffles, tubers and bulbs - all plant life which
requires healthy soil. conditions to grow. In the process of searching out such food sources, grizzlies
engage in what many biologists refer to as "gardening:" digging up large patches of soil and in the
process increasing available nitrogen in the ground, thereby enhancing future growth of the bear's food
sources. For further discussion of grizzly habitat needs, See Daniel Mathews, Rocky Mountain Natural
History (Raven Editions, 2003).
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and redressability requirements are relaxed.68 Unfortunately, this standard
is backward. A more effective approach would be to greatly reduce the
injury in fact requirement, so as to almost presume injury, while keeping
the same standard for causation and redressability. This would insure that
wild places would not go unspoken for, while at the same time prevent the
creation of a new cause of action. Courts would still be free to dismiss a
case on the basis of standing if the named defendant was not responsible for
the act in question (causation) or if the court was unable to fix the problem
(redressability). However, this would end what is essentially an additional
burden required for environmental plaintiffs. More specifically, it would be
a step in the right direction toward acknowledging the inherent value of the
natural world.
In many ways, such a change would be another step toward realizing Jus-
tice Douglas's vision in his Sierra Club v. Morton dissent.69 While Justice
Douglas's opinion, at first glance, seems rather extreme, upon further ex-
amination it is essentially what environmental litigants are forced to show
today. For example, while calling for inanimate natural places to have
standing on their own, Justice Douglas later explains that an individual with
sufficient personal knowledge and interest in the place should be named as
guardian ad litem for the purposes of litigation. 70 Sadly, it is in the applica-
tion, however, that the spirit of the Justice Douglas dissent is ignored. In-
deed, it is this fundamental acknowledgment that the world does not simply
exist for human purposes that is absent from the American legal system and
the Court's opinion in Ursus. As Justice Douglas himself put it:
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers,
lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swamp-
land, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of
modem technology and modem life. The river, for exam-
ple, is the living symbol of all the life it sustains or nour-
ishes - fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher,
deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who
are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound,
or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological
unit of life that is part of it.
71
VII. CONCLUSION
The holding in Ursus relies on a cold, formal "logic" that ignores all that
makes it special to exist on this Earth. It is a logic bom of economic inter-
ests with little regard for the bear, intent instead on shutting out "the small
68. Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 682.
69. 405 U.S. at 741-55.
70. Id. at 750.
71. Id. at 743.
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and the innovative., 72 Such a system knows nothing of the weight of a
pack on your back and seven days of trail in front of you. It is ignorant of
migration, disregards the wisdom of the fox, and ignores the sound of a
breeze through ponderosa pines. Such a system of laws is a result of a cen-
turies-long process of lessons taught and lessons learned. Yet it has not a
lemming's knowledge of how to choose a good site for winter hibernation.
Indeed, it is a circular logic that says no one can speak for the protection
of a black bear roaming the banks of the Rogue River in western Oregon
and then says it is OK to kill that bear because no one has spoken for it.
Tell that to the bear who simply wishes to scratch its claws on the bark of a
Douglas fir, or to the Douglas fir which simply wishes to have a bear
scratch its bark.
72. Wilkinson, The Eagle Bird at 13.
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The Public Land and Resources Law Review would like to thank every-
one who attended or participated in last year's Public Land Law Confer-
ence, National Policy Implications of the Clark Fork River Basin Natural
Resource Damage Program. Your participation made last year's confer-
ence a huge success.
We invite you to join us at the University of Montana School of Law this
September 24-26 for the 31st Annual Public Land Law Conference, Rocky
Mountain Energy Leadership: Strategies for a New Energy Future.
This year's conference will bring together leaders from government, in-
dustry, academia and the legal and conservation communities for a timely
discussion of the growing and changing energy demands in the Rocky
Mountain Region.
The conference will offer a broad context of national law and policy as
well as detailed discussions of current regional issues. A variety of panels
will discuss numerous proposals aimed at leading the country towards re-
newable energy sources, cleaner technology, and energy conservation, as
well as the implications on western landscapes, communities, and econom-
ics.
Please visit www.publiclandlawconference.org for more information
about conference details, including the agenda, registration, continuing.
education credit, and sponsorship.
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